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In this paper, we test implications from various theories of hierarchies in or-
ganizations, in particular the assignment model (Rosen, 1982), the incentives
model (Rosen, 1986), the supervision model (Qian, 1994) and the knowledge-
based hierarchy model (Garicano, 2000; Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006).
We use a unique dataset providing personnel records from a large European
￿rm in an high tech manufacturing industry from January 1997 to May 2004.
An unusually rare feature of this dataset is that relationships within the hi-
erarchy are reported and we can therefore identify the chain of command.
Some of our results are in line with the Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)
model of hierarchies when communication costs are decreasing: we observe
an increase in the span, an increase in wage inequality between job levels, and
the introduction of a new hierarchical level. However, we also ￿nd evidence
of learning and reallocation of talent within and across job levels, a ￿nding
that can not be explained by a static model of knowledge based hierarchy
but rather by dynamic models of careers in organizations (e.g. Gibbons and
Waldman, 1999). We then propose a new model of hierarchies where individ-
uals accumulate general and managerial human capital on the job, and ￿rms
learn gradually about individuals￿managerial ability and allocate managers
to span according to their expected e⁄ective ability. This theory explains our
empirical ￿ndings and provides a richer theory of careers in hierarchies.
Keywords: hierarchy, span of control, wage determination, promotions,
careers
JEL Codes: J24, J31, M51 Introduction
The modern ￿rm is typically organized internally as an hierarchy. Previ-
ous theoretical attempts to understand the concept of hierarchy have led to
a large body of literature emphasizing di⁄erent mechanisms and trade o⁄s
that ￿rms faced1. Yet, there have been few attempts2 to study this topic
empirically, probably because data about hierarchical relationships are ex-
tremely hard to get. Despite the richness of ￿rms￿personnel records which
have become increasingly available to researchers (see e.g. Gibbs and Hen-
dricks, 2004 and the papers referenced therein), none of the existing datasets
provide information about the chain of command and the span of control.
This is a unique feature of our dataset that we are able to exploit for our
analysis.
In this paper, we explore a brandnew dataset providing a clear description
of the hierarchical structure and reporting relationships of a large European
￿rm, and we investigate some key predictions from various theories of hierar-
chies. These theories in practice generate many similar results and testable
predictions (a similar concern has been formulated when testing incentives
theories, see e.g. Prendergast, 1999). Our main goal is to assess whether
these theoretical predictions are veri￿ed in the data, but we also discuss
attempts to distinguish between them.
We ￿rst discuss the large literature about hierarchies, emphasizing the
di⁄erences between the various theories, and their empirical predictions. We
distinguish between static theories of hierarchies - leaving aside careers in
organizations - and dynamic theories of careers - leaving unmodelled im-
plications for the span of control. We then propose a simple framework
reconciling these two strands of the literature.
Turning to our empirical analysis, we document the evolution of the hi-
erarchy and the evolution of the average span of control. The company has
become ￿ atter and the span of control for each layer has increased, in line
with what happened in the U.S. over a longer time period (Rajan and Wulf,
2003). In a second step, we describe the evolution of the wage gap between
job levels. We observe an increase in the wage gaps between levels, also in
line with the evidence in Rajan and Wulf. We then test whether the span of
1See the next section for a detailed discussion of the literature.
2Exceptions are Ort￿n-`ngel and Salas-FumÆs (2002) and Rajan and Wul⁄(2003) using
survey data from top executives in di⁄erent ￿rms; and Garicano and Hubbard (2003, 2004)
using census data from law ￿rms. Again see next section.
1control has an e⁄ect on managerial compensation and look at the evolution
of the relationship. Several theories of hierarchies suggest a positive rela-
tionship between span and compensation and we try to distinguish between
them. We also analyze the relationship between the size of the bonus and
the number of subordinates, since ￿rms should have more ￿ exibility to re-
ward supervision using bonuses rather than wages. We ￿nd that wages and
bonuses are positively related to span of control, as implied by supervision
models like Qian (1994) but also by sorting models like Rosen (1982) or the
knowledge hierarchy model of Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
However, these models do not consider dynamic reallocations within the
hierarchy, as in incentive models (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 2004)
and models of careers in organizations (i.e. Gibbons and Waldman, 1999a).
Therefore, as a next step, we look at the relationship between the span of
control and the probability of promotion to the next level in the hierarchy.
We ￿nd that the number of subordinates in a layer is positively related to
the probability of being promoted to the next layer. We also analyze the
endogeneity of the span. We ￿nd that the number of subordinates in the
previous layer has a positive e⁄ect on the number of subordinates in the cur-
rent layer. These ￿ndings tend to indicate that ￿rms learn about individuals￿
general and managerial ability by allocating them to positions where they
have responsabilities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature about
hierarchies and the empirical implications of the di⁄erent models. Section
3 provides a detailed description of the dataset, as well as some summary




Many theories have been developed that try to understand the economic
problems that hierarchies are supposed to solve (for an early survey, see
Holmst￿m and Tirole, 1989, pp. 106-126). These theories can roughly be di-
vided in ￿ve groups for our purposes: hierarchies as information processors,
hierarchies as supervision technologies, hierarchies as incentive mechanisms,
hierarchies as sorting and learning mechanisms, and knowledge based hier-
2archies. We discuss each of them and what are their implications regarding
the span of control and its relationship with careers and wages.
2.1.1 Hierarchies as information processors
In this literature, hierarchies are designed to process information optimally.
The main paper that we consider is Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) (see also
surveys by Radner, 1992 and Van Zandt, 1998). The aim of the organiza-
tion is to minimize both the costs of processing information and the costs of
communicating this information. Agents can specialize processing the same
type of information but more specialization also implies more coordination
and therefore higher costs of communication. This explains why e¢ cient net-
works are centralized. They also ￿nd that e¢ cient networks take a pyramidal
forms, as individuals report only to one agent.
This theory is di¢ cult to test with our data, since we have no informa-
tion about the way information is processed. However, indirect implications
can be tested. Among these, their model predicts that the span of control
decreases along the hierarchy and that a reduction of communication costs
leads to ￿ atter organizations.
One criticism against this literature is the oversimplistic representation
of the agent. The authors recognize this limitation:
￿The management literature stresses other dimensions besides
work-overload and communication costs, such as motivation of
managers, making lower level employees more responsible and
eager to take initiatives, etc. A natural avenue for future research
is to include some of these dimensions into our model and explore
how they a⁄ect the design of internal organizations￿(p.835)
We discuss some of these issues below.
2.1.2 Hierarchies as supervision technologies
Our reference paper is Qian (1994). His paper extends previous work on
supervision by Williamson (1967) and Calvo and Wellisz (1979) and on e¢ -
ciency wage theory by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). He develops a model of
hierarchical production and e¢ ciency wages with endogenous probability of
detection. Supervision is used to mitigate moral hazard, and the probability
of monitoring decreases with the span. However, there is also loss of control
3along the hierarchy. The trade-o⁄ is the following: reducing the number of
levels decreases cumulative loss but increases the span, and therefore leads
to higher wages. The organization therefore tries to ￿nd the optimal number
of layers and average span to maximize production.
His model generates interesting testable predictions:
￿First, in the optimal hierarchy in which all managers and work-
ers are identical ex ante, wages fall and e⁄orts decrease as one
moves from the top to the bottom of the hierarchies. [...] Sec-
ond, as the size of the hierarchy increases, both e⁄orts and wages
of managers at the top increase because their marginal product
increases, and both e⁄ort and wages of workers fall because their
marginal product declines." (p.528)
One limitation of this approach is that it is not clear to see the dynamics
of careers.
2.1.3 Promotions in hierarchies as incentives mechanisms
Tournament theory provides another incentives theory but based on ex ante
incentive mechanism provided by promotions. Individuals have incentives to
perform well relative to thir peers to increase their probability of being pro-
moted (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Allowing for multi-periods tournaments,
Rosen (1986) provides a model that generates an interesting testable predic-
tion: optimally set wages (leading to e⁄ort being equal in all layers) increase
along the hierarchy when individuals are risk averse.
Limitations of that type of analysis, that we discuss more in details in
the next subsection, is that individuals are often considered to be identical.
If they are not, then observable di⁄erences in ability a⁄ect negatively the
incentives e⁄ect. However, if di⁄erences in ability are not observable, then the
organization also learns about the agent￿ s ability. This problem is considered
by Lazear (2004). He generates a few testable implications. First, promotions
are based on past performance. Second, e⁄ort diminishes drastically after
the last promotion. Third, individuals in higher levels have higher expected
ability.
2.1.4 Learning, assignment and selection in hierarchies
In assignment models, individuals of higher ability are assigned to positions
where they are more productive at. In Rosen (1982)￿ s model, manager￿ s
4ability is spread along the hierarchy (decisions of managers matter for the
productivity of production workers) and therefore receive higher wages. How-
ever, in practice, ￿rms only learn progressively about managerial ability by
observing individuals￿performance and individuals are reassigned to new
positions on the basis of their expected ability (see e.g. Gibbons and Katz,
1992; Farber and Gibbons, 1996).
Recently, Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) proposed to combine various
building blocks models to better explain careers in organizations. They show
that a model with job assignment, learning and on-the-job human capital
accumulation generates many of the stylized facts about careers in organi-
zations (Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr￿m, 1994). However, their model ignores
externalities of managers￿ability on workers￿productivity, and incentive is-
sues (see however Gibbons and Waldman, 1999b).
2.1.5 Knowledge based hierarchies
In this type of models, ￿rms use hierarchies to organize knowledge optimally
and to solve coordination problems in the presence of specialization. These
models are unique in the sense that they look at the e⁄ect of information
technologies on the shape of hierarchy, the span of control and, more recently,
on the wage structure within ￿rms. Their model generates a unique set of
predictions.
In Garicano (2000), ex ante identical individuals decide to invest in ac-
quiring knowledge to solve problems. The optimal organization of work has
the following properties: workers are allocated to di⁄erent layers according
to the type of knowledge that they have learned (individuals at higher levels
specialized in solving harder problems) with no overlapping of knowledge.
Technological change a⁄ects organizational design. The model predicts the
following. First, a decrease in both the cost of communication and the cost
of acquiring knowledge increases the span of control. Second, these two dif-
ferent aspects have di⁄erent implications on the number of layers: cheaper
acquisition of knowledge reduces the number of layers, but cheaper transmis-
sion of knowledge has an ambiguous e⁄ect. Third, an increase in complexity
reduces the span of control and increases the number of layers.
Building on Garicano (2000), Garicano and Rossi Hansberg (2006) pro-
vide an equilibrium theory where agents di⁄er in cognitive ability (high abil-
ity agents have lower cost of acquiring knowledge) and wages are used to
allocate workers to teams. Therefore, the initial assignement of workers to
5layers has important e¢ ciency implications. This theory provides a richer set
of testable predictions. First, there is positive sorting: high ability managers
hire high ability workers, allowing the manager to specialize in solving the
hardest problems. Second, wages are increasing and convex in ability. Third,
smarter agents work in higher layers and manage larger teams, i.e. there is
segmentation by skill. Fourth, improvement in the access to information
(lower learning costs) leads to more decentralization, higher span of control,
an ambiguous e⁄ect on the number of layers and an increase in within and
total wage inequality. Fifth, improvement in communication leads to higher
wage inequality between layers, an increase in the span of control, and an
increase in the number of layers.
They discuss how their model can explain the evolution of hierarchies
observed over the 80￿ s and 90￿ s. At the end of the 80￿ s and the beginning of
the 90￿ s, decrease in the cost of accessing information led to changes in the
wage structure and the organization of production. Cheaper knowledge led to
an increase in the span, an increase in the demand for skills, a decrease in the
number of layers, and an increase of wage inequality within and across layers.
In the mid and late 90￿ s, a decrease in communication costs was associated
with an increase in the span, an increase in wage inequality between layers
(bot not within) and an ambiguous e⁄ect on the number of layers (stable
then increasing).
Garicano and Hubbard (2004) extend the analysis to include on the job
training. They ￿nd that on the job training reinforces positive sorting be-
tween workers and managers. More talented managers select workers who
can solve more problems by themselves (and ask less questions) and that
have a lower learning cost on the job.
Limitation of this type of analysis is that individuals are either identical ex
ante (Garicano, 2000) or they di⁄er according to their cognitive ability, which
is known ex ante. Therefore, individuals are always allocated optimally and
the model generates few implications about mobility within the hierarchy.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
Empirical evidence about these theories of hierarchy has been scarce and has
mostly used survey data. Ort￿n-`ngel and Salas-FumÆs (2002) use survey
data from a repeated cross-section of 669 Spanish ￿rms for the period 1990-
1992. They ￿nd that wage di⁄erences between layers is lower than span of
control at any position, and that manager￿ s human capital explains a large
6fraction of wage di⁄erences between layers, suggesting an allocation process
of talent along the hierarchy.
Rajan and Wulf (2003) document the evolution of the shape of the hier-
archy using survey data from a panel of more than 300 large U.S. companies
over the period 1986-1999. They observe a ￿ attening of the ￿rm: more in-
dividuals report directly to the CEO, the span of control has increased and
the number of layers has diminished. Moreover, the structure of pay has
changed as well, organizations moving towards more pay inequality. They
discuss potential explanations for their results, including technological change
and change in product market competition.
Garicano and Hubbard (2004) use census data about U.S. law ￿rms and
test the theory of positive sorting. They ￿nd evidence in favor of their the-
ory: partners and associates are sorted by law school quality but not by
experience.
Finally, Fox (2006) uses the Swedish linked employer-employee dataset
and provides some evidence consistent with the Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) model, as ￿rm-size wage gaps increase with job responsability for
managerial employees.
2.3 Our analysis
In this paper, we look at the link between wage, bonus, promotions and span
of control, and at the reallocation process of talent within the hierarchy. We
focus our attention on the dynamic process of control and job reallocation
inside a given ￿rm, as opposed to the previous studies.
The theoretical model that we test is the following: individuals accu-
mulate general and managerial human capital on the job; ￿rms learn about
the general (possible task speci￿c) and managerial ability of their employ-
ees, assign them to job levels and teams according to what is learned about
their ability, as individuals are assigned to their most productive use; there-
fore, their span of control depends on their expected ability. Their ability
moreover generates externalities on workers. Managers also supervise work-
ers and ￿rms provide incentives to their workers (through wage structure,
promotions, bonuses and promises of higher future wages).
73 Data
The dataset provides con￿dential personnel records for all domestic3 employ-
ees from a large European ￿rm. To protect the anonimity of the ￿rm, we
can only disclose a few elements describing its activities. The ￿rm operates
in an high tech manufacturing industry, has grown signi￿cantly over the last
decade, has been very innovative and has remained one of the world leaders
in its product line. The frequency of observations is monthly and spans the
period from January 1997 to May 2004. The dataset was actually provided
in two waves: January 1997-July 2001, and September 2001-May 2004. The
second wave provides data after the company switched to another Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) process. As such, it can be seen as a major techno-
logical change facilitating communication and the circulation of information
within the ￿rm.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the size of the company (we only consider
the mother company and not the smallest subsidiaries). Over the 8-years




The distribution of formal authority in the ￿rm is relatively simple. There
are only 5 job levels based on job description: non managerial employees (job
level 0), lower management (job level 1), middle management (job level 2),
upper management (job level 3) and top management (job level 4).
Moreover, the company also uses a dual career ladder: for the ￿rst two
positions, they have professional managers (job level 1b) and professional
middle managers (job level 2b). The reason for making this distinction is
that the company wants to o⁄er career opportunities for individuals with
technical skills, but who might not be suited for managerial positions. As
a consequence, they rarely supervise teams of workers, but promotion to
these job titles provides important wage increases, and therefore ex ante
motivation.
3Although the percentage is declining, a large bulk of the ￿rm￿ s activities still take
place within the country.
8Finally, the ￿rm decided to add a new informal layer in 2001. The
role of the individuals at this level were to help the manager ful￿lling her
supervisory tasks and facilitate a more intensive production process. We
refer to individuals at this level as assistant managers (job level 0.5). The
observation that the number of job levels has not increased formally, despite
the dramatic growth of the ￿rm, can be seen as very similar to the ￿nding
in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstr￿m (1994) (henceforth BGH).
Figure 2 describes the job levels in the ￿rm.
<Insert Figure 2>
The number of managers has increased, but proportionaly less than em-
ployment (Figure 3), implying an increase in the span of control (see more
on this below).
<Insert Figure 3>
In September 2001, the company tried to remedy to that evolution and
hired a signi￿cant amount of new managers. Moreover, as we just men-
tionned, the ￿rm has introduced this new informal layer of assistant man-
ager. These assistant managers have been allocated in those departments
where managers had the highest span of control.
Evidence suggests therefore that the organization has become more de-
centralized and has introduced a new layer.
3.2 Job Transition
Figures 4 shows the number of promotions along the hierarchical career for
the two periods. During the ￿rst period, there were about two promotions
a month from worker to manager; three promotions a month from worker
to professional manager. While the average number of promotions remained
relatively stable for managers in the second period, it increased dramatically
for professional managers to an average of 4.5 promotions a month. Another
striking observation is that professional managers are much less likely to be
promoted further along the hierarchy. On the contrary, the average number
of managers being promoted to middle managers increased slightly from 0.4
to 0.6. Promotions to upper management is much rarer and only concerns
middle managers. Finally, we observed one promotion to top management.
Demotions are rare and are omitted from the ￿gure. We also notice entry and
9exit at all layers of the ￿rm, although limited at the last two layers, providing
further evidence against the importance of "ports of entry and exit".
<Insert Figure 4>
3.3 Teams, departments, and span of control
An unusually rare feature of this dataset is that relationships within the
hierarchy are reported, i.e. for each employee, it is known precisely who is
his manager, to whom the manager reports, and so on. This means that
we have a clear description of the chain of command. On the basis of this
information, we created our unit of analysis, a team, or a "cell"4, de￿ned as a
group of workers with the same supervisor and the same chain of command.
This is the smallest unit in the chain of command. This clearly established
relationship allows a richer analysis of the internal economics of the ￿rm than
previous studies.
Teams often coincide with the department, especially the smaller ones,
while the large ones sometimes include more than one department. Some
managers are in some cases in charge of more than one department (for
example, one administrative department and two production departments
with closely realted activities). The number of teams in our dataset has
increased from 235 in May 2000 to 382 in May 2004, while the number of
departments increased from 342 by name (344 by number) in January 1997
to 437 by name (420 by number) in July 2001, and then to 607 by name (415
by number, 800 including subdepartments) in May 2004.
Departments are organized in ￿ve larger units, dividing ￿nancial, sales
and marketing, R&D, administrative and production tasks.
The span of control is then simply constructed by combining information
about job levels and the chain of command. We de￿ne the span of control
of a manager as the number of subordinates who refer to him as the manager.
It is also equal to the size of the team. Table 3 shows the evolution of the
span of control for managers.
4Looking at the evolution, we can study the internal biology of the ￿rm (see Smeets
and Warzynski, 2006a). By de￿nition, our notion of the cell is intrinsically linked to
the individual in charge of the cell. When the manager of the cell leaves her position
(either because she is promoted, she is reallocated to another cell or she leaves the ￿rm),
the position becomes vacant. The cell dies and is replaced by another one, with a new
individual in charge. Moreover, units are sometimes reorganized, leading to a process of
creative destruction of cells.
10<Insert Table 1>
We see that the manager￿ s span of control has increased on average, as
was already seen on Figure 2. After a temporary decline after 2001, the span
started rising again.
The notion of the span of control becomes more complicated for middle
managers. Middle managers are responsible for managers but also have their
own team, which is not responsible for workers. Moreover, middle managers
also command indirectly workers under a manager. Therefore, we de￿ne
three di⁄erent measures of the span: the direct span (number of managers),
the team and the indirect span (number of workers reporting through the
manager). In our regressions, we use only the indirect span, in line with the
theoreticl idea that talent is spread through the hierarchy. Table 4 provides
summary statistics about the evolution of these measures.
<Insert Table 2>
The team managed by midde managers has remained relatively constant
over the period, while the average number of managers has slightly increased.
For higher levels of management, the number of dimensions to be consid-
ered increases even more. For a matter of concision, we omit to discuss them
in this paper.
3.4 Individual information
Besides information about job description, position in the chain of command,
department and unit, we have information about wage, bonus, tenure in the
￿rm, age, gender, nationality,...
Wage is the monthly wage before tax. Bonus is the monthly bonus be-
fore tax. Bonuses are usually concentrated around the end of the year, but
also occur during the year. Tenure is de￿ned in years and is de￿ned as the
di⁄erence between the observation data and the hiring date. Age is de￿ned
in years. We have detailed information about the individual education level.
We use a summary measure (EDU) where individuals are divided in ￿ve
groups: those with basic education (EDU=0), those with some technical de-
gree or vocational education (EDU=1), those with technical higher education
(EDU=2), those with BA or BSc level education (EDU=3) and those with a
Ms, MA or PhD level education (EDU=4).
114 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Evolution of the wage gap between levels
We ￿rst look at the evolution of wage inequality between job levels. To
analyze this, we run a traditional Mincerian regression of monthly wage over
human capital variables (￿rm tenure and age in a quadratic form) and job
level variables for each month in the dataset. We also include education
dummies and gender as control variables. The coe¢ cients for each job level
measure the wage di⁄erence between a worker (job 0, our control group) and
the individuals in various managerial positions. We then plot the coe¢ cients
of the job levels on Figure 6 to illustrate the evolution of wage di⁄erences
between layers in our ￿rm.
logWit = ￿0 + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2






￿JL (DJL)it + controls + "it 8t
<Insert Figure 5>
We see that wage inequality has increased between levels, and also that
the di⁄erence between traditional managers and professional managers has
increased as well. We suspect that part of this di⁄erence might be explained
by the fact tht professional managers do not exert supervision tasks. We test
this in the following subsections.
4.2 Span of Control, Wages and Bonuses
We then test the e⁄ect of the span of control on wage. Our assumption is that
more responsability should be associated with higher wage, either because
individuals have been selected to become manager and have higher ability,
or because they exert more e⁄ort.
logWit = ￿0 + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2
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+controls + "it
12<Insert Table 3>
Results are shown in table 5. Age and tenure have the usual e⁄ect.
However, age appears to have a stronger e⁄ect on compensation than tenure.
Especially once controlling for job level, tenure has a remarkably small e⁄ect,
a ￿nding similar to BGH (table 5, p. 907).
The e⁄ect of job levels provide an average of ￿gure 5. However, the wage
di⁄erence between layers is slightly lower when we control for the span. As
such, it does not bring additional explanatory power but instead divides the
job level e⁄ects in two components: one linked to the size of the team and an-
other purely linked to the level. For ease of interpretation, we use a rescaled
measure of the span, dividing the number of individuals supervised by the
manager/middle manager by the average span of managers/middle managers
over the period. The span of control has a positive e⁄ect on compensation
for both managers and middle managers, in line with several of the theories
we discussed in section 2. The e⁄ect is relatively large: For managers, su-
pervising a team twice as large as the average implies a salary di⁄erence of
2.8%. For middle managers, being indirectly responsible for twice as many
workers implies a wage di⁄erence of 4.1%. This shows that the ￿rm rewards
supervision tasks with higher salaries and uses wage di⁄erentation within
job level. Looking at the second period, we see that wages of managers and
middle managers have become slightly less sensitive to the span but more
sensitive to the level.
We also ran a similar regression by job level to investigate further this
wage heterogeneity within job level. For managers, we simply use the number
of workers they supervise divided by the average span of managers over the
period as an adjusted measure of the span:
logWit = ￿0 + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2
it + ￿3AGE + ￿4 (AGE)
2
it
+￿S;MDMAdjSpanManit + controls + "it
<Insert Table 4>
For middle managers (job level 2), we use the indirect measure of the span,
i.e. the number of workers supervised by managers themselves supervised by
the middle manager, divided by the average indirect span of middle managers
13over the period:
logWit = ￿0 + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2
it + ￿3AGE + ￿4 (AGE)
2
it
+￿MMAdjSpanMidManit + controls + "it
<Insert Table 5>
Similar results are found, meaning that within job level, supervising more
workers translates into higher wages.
We run a similar regression using bonuses instead of wages. Wages are
very likely to be less ￿ exible than bonuses, so that ￿rms might use bonuses
instead of wages to reward supervision. We therefore test the idea that,
when individuals receive bonuses, the size depends on responsability. We do
not test occurence of bonus as a function of performance since the latter is
unavailable in our dataset.
logBONUS = ￿0 + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2
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Results are shown in table 6. We ￿nd that bonuses are much more sen-
sitive to job levels than wages. Looking at the e⁄ect of the span, we obtain
similar results (see table 6) than for the wage regression in the ￿rst period,
but the span as manager has a negative e⁄ect in the second period. One
explanation might be that the ￿rm has used a di⁄erent notion of the job,
now de￿ned more precisely. Other explanation is of course that the deter-
mination of bonuses has been changed dramatically, for example following
negotiation with unions, leading to a lack of ￿ exibility in a context of rising
span of control. Yet another explanation is that the introduction of assis-
tant managers has modi￿ed the logic of the determination. The size of the
bonus is positively related to the number of subordinates as middle manager.
Bonuses have also become more sensitive to rank, less to seniority and more
to age.
<Insert Table 6>
14To sum up, our results so far indicate:
- a positive link between span of control and wage
- an increase in the span of control
- the introduction of a new informal layer
- an increase in the wage gap between layers (independently of the span
of control e⁄ect)
- promotions along the hierarchical ladder
The ￿rst result in particular can be explained by the knowledge hierarchy
model, the assignment model and by the incentives model, and it would be
di¢ cult to disentangle these two e⁄ects. Moreover, it could be an artifact of
the data, as most ￿rms use formal salary systems that link responsabilities
to wage level categories. We therefore decide to devote more attention to the
issue of reallocation across job levels along the hierarchy.
4.3 Probability of promotion
As a next step, we analyze the relationship between the span of control
and the probability of promotion. We perform a probit regression where
the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual is
promoted and 0 otherwise. We ￿rst consider the promotion probability from
manager to middle manager, and relate it to the span as manager (in t￿1).
What we want to test is whether individuals who had more responsabilities
in the previous layer have a higher probability of promotion. The idea is that
the ￿rm learned about the manager￿ s ability to supervise workers and took
the promotion decision accordingly. We also include age and age squared to
control for the accumulation of (general) human capital variables. We also
used seniority to control for the accumulation of ￿rm speci￿c human capital,
but the variables were not signi￿cant. The variables used as controls include




it = ￿0 + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2
it + ￿3AGE + ￿4 (AGE)
2
it








Table 7 presents marginal changes. Since we use monthly data, promo-
tions occur rarely in percentage. One has to compare our coe¢ cient to the
observed probability of promotion. We ￿nd that the lagged adjusted span
as manager has a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on the probability to be
promoted middle manager.
4.4 Endogeneity of span
In this section, we try to better understand the factors that in￿ uence the
number of subordinates.
We ￿rst look at the relationship between the adjusted span as middle
manager and the span as manager before promotion. In this regression, we
therefore only use information from those individuals who were promoted
from manager to middle manager during the period of analysis.
AdjSpanMidMan = ￿ + ￿1TENUREit + ￿2 (TENURE)
2
it + ￿3AGE + ￿4 (AGE)
2
it
+￿S;MDMAdjSpanMani(t￿1) + controls + "it
<Insert Table 8>
Our results con￿rm the hypothesis that high span as a manager has a
positive e⁄ect on the span as middle manager. In other words, managing a
large number of workers in the previous layer can be seen as a positive signal
regarding your managerial ability, as ￿rms learn gradually about individuals￿
managerial talent.
To sum up, our results illustrate that human capital and learning a⁄ect
the number of subordinates, and that the number of subordinates also has
implications for wages, bonus and career dynamics.
5 Conclusion
Our results appear to con￿rm implications from the Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg (2005) model and other models like Bolton and Dewatripont (1994),
Rosen (1982) and Qian (1994). We ￿nd that the span of control has increased,
16wage inequality has increased between layers. We also ￿nd that higher spans
are associated with higher wages and -in most cases- higher bonuses.
But we also stress a di⁄erent mechanism present in Gibbons and Waldman
(1999): learning about managerial ability. Indeed, we ￿nd that the span can
partly be determined by fast track decision from the ￿rm, and that the span
has implications for the future individual career. It partly explains promotion
decisions, what suggests that ￿rms ￿learn through the span￿ , i.e. use the span
decision as a way to learn about managerial ability.
Combining these two characteristics within a single theoretical framework
opens new and exciting avenues for the study of careers in hierarchies, and
explains our empirical results.
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19Table 1: Span as manager (in May of each year)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 24.43 25.09 28.63 29.86 32.62 29.01 29.25 29.98
Median 16 17 17 17 20 16 16 16
Std. dev. 28.47 27.04 32.28 32.52 37.42 37.04 38.59 38.33
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Max 214 164 171 187 211 259 272 286
Nr. of obs. 159 172 148 161 177 214 231 254
Table 2: Direct and indirect span as middle manager (in May
of each year)
Direct subordinates - Team
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 22.30 17.37 26.77 24.79 24.65 13.59 13.70 21.14
Median 13 10 18 11 10 8 7 6
Std. dev. 22.68 22.78 29.38 34.22 39.48 19.57 26.01 53.47
Min 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1
Max 214 164 171 187 211 259 272 286
Nr. of obs. 56 60 43 48 57 71 71 76
Direct subordinates - Managers
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 2.79 2.90 3.42 3.04 3.09 3.10 3.52 3.39
Median 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3
Std. dev. 3.56 3.58 3.74 3.51 3.96 3.27 3.57 3.73
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Max 18 17 12 13 17 13 13 20
Nr. of obs. 56 60 43 48 57 71 71 76
Indirect subordinates - Workers
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 90.33 88.52 125.05 119.71 127.63 106.42 109.54 118.85
Median 37 36 57 39 40 42 41 45
Std. dev. 125.35 126.09 163.16 170.73 195.42 167.55 177.11 180.78
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Max 615 640 784 691 871 821 875 975
Nr. of obs. 56 60 43 48 57 71 71 76
20Table 3A: Wage regression (￿rst period)
Jan 1997 - July. 2001
Dependent variable: logW
Tenure 0.011￿￿￿ (0.0001) 0.005￿￿￿ (0.0001) 0.005￿￿￿ (0.0001)
Tenure2 /100 -0.017￿￿￿ (0.0005) -0.005￿￿￿ (0.0004) 0.003￿￿￿ (0.0005)
Age 0.038￿￿￿ (0.0003) 0.037￿￿￿ (0.0003) 0.037￿￿￿ (0.0003)
Age2 / 100 -0.041￿￿￿ (0.0004) -0.041￿￿￿ (0.0004) -0.041￿￿￿ (0.0004)
Technical or vocational education 0.039￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.043￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.043￿￿￿ (0.001)
Technical higher education 0.059￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.056￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.055￿￿￿ (0.001)
BA, BS 0.25￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.21￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.21￿￿￿ (0.001)
MA, MSc, PhD 0.45￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.34￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.34￿￿￿ (0.001)
Female YES
Job level: Assistant Manager - - -
Job level: Prof. Manager - 0.27￿￿￿ (0.002) 0.27￿￿￿ (0.002)
Job level: Manager - 0.32￿￿￿ (0.002) 0.30￿￿￿ (0.002)
Job level: Prof. Mid. Manager - 0.46￿￿￿ (0.003) 0.46￿￿￿ (0.003)
Job level: Mid. Manager - 0.56￿￿￿ (0.002) 0.53￿￿￿ (0.002)
Span as Manager / 27.86 - - 0.028￿￿￿ (0.001)
Span as Middle Manager / 107.3 - - 0.041￿￿￿ (0.002)
Month dummies YES
Adj. R2 0.61 0.73 0.73
Nr. Obs. 256,707
21Table 3B: Wage regression (second period)
Sept. 2001 - May 2004
Dependent variable: logW
Tenure 0.011￿￿￿ (0.0001) 0.005￿￿￿ (0.0001) 0.005￿￿￿ (0.0001)
Tenure2 /100 -0.017￿￿￿ (0.0004) -0.003￿￿￿ (0.0003) -0.003￿￿￿ (0.0003)
Age 0.031￿￿￿ (0.0003) 0.029￿￿￿ (0.0002) 0.029￿￿￿ (0.0002)
Age2 / 100 -0.033￿￿￿ (0.0003) -0.031￿￿￿ (0.0003) -0.031￿￿￿ (0.0003)
Technical or vocational education 0.051￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.052￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.052￿￿￿ (0.001)
Technical higher education 0.10￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.093￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.092￿￿￿ (0.001)
BA, BS 0.34￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.284￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.282￿￿￿ (0.001)
MA, MSc, PhD 0.52￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.393￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.393￿￿￿ (0.001)
Female YES
Job level: Assistant Manager - 0.21￿￿￿ (0.002) 0.21￿￿￿ (0.002)
Job level: Prof. Manager - 0.29￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.29￿￿￿ (0.001)
Job level: Manager - 0.36￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.35￿￿￿ (0.001)
Job level: Prof. Mid. Manager - 0.47￿￿￿ (0.003) 0.47￿￿￿ (0.003)
Job level: Mid. Manager - 0.59￿￿￿ (0.003) 0.56￿￿￿ (0.003)
Span as Manager / 29.47 - - 0.019￿￿￿ (0.001)
Span as Middle Manager / 110.45 - - 0.032￿￿￿ (0.001)
Month dummies YES
Adj. R2 0.68 0.81 0.81
Nr. Obs. 241,949
22Table 4: The relationship between wages and span. for man-
agers only
Jan. 1997 - July 2001 Sept. 2001 - May 2004
Dependent variable: logW
Tenure 0.008￿￿￿ (0.0005) 0.002￿￿￿ (0.0005)
Tenure2 -0.031￿￿￿(0.002) -0.010￿￿￿(0.002)
Age 0.023￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.021￿￿￿ (0.001)
Age2 -0.025￿￿￿ (0.002) -0.022￿￿￿ (0.002)




Adj. R2 0.58 0.33
Nr. Obs. 9005 7766
Table 5: The relationship between wages and span. for middle
managers only
Jan. 1997 - July 2001 Sept. 2001 - May 2004
Dependent variable: logW
Tenure 0.014￿￿￿ (0.001) 0.006￿￿￿ (0.001)
Tenure2 -0.028￿￿￿ (0.003) -0.009￿￿￿ (0.003)
Age -0.026￿￿￿ (0.004) 0.001 (0.004)
Age2 0.029￿￿￿(0.004) -0.002 (0.004)




Adj. R2 0.39 0.24
Nr. Obs. 3856 3384
23Table 6: Bonus regressions
Jan 1997 - July. 2001 Sept. 2001 - May 2004
Dependent variable: logBonus
Tenure 0.005￿￿ (0.002) -0.0003 (0.002)
Tenure2 /100 -0.020￿￿￿ (0.008) 0.006 (0.007)
Age 0.014￿￿ (0.006) 0.023￿￿￿ (0.005)
Age2 / 100 -0.018￿￿￿ (0.007) -0.030￿￿￿ (0.006)
Education dummies YES
Female YES
Job level: Assistant Manager - 0.31￿￿￿ (0.031)
Job level: Prof. Manager 0.39￿￿￿ (0.021) 0.56￿￿￿ (0.021)
Job level: Manager 0.58￿￿￿ (0.024) 0.76￿￿￿ (0.024)
Job level: Prof. Mid. Manager 0.73￿￿￿ (0.041) 0.84￿￿￿ (0.046)
Job level: Mid. Manager 0.86￿￿￿ (0.029) 1.13￿￿￿ (0.034)
Adjusted Span 0.042￿￿￿ (0.016) -0.050￿￿￿ (0.012)
Adjusted Span 0.056￿￿￿ (0.018) 0.19￿￿￿ (0.021)
Month dummies YES
Adj. R2 0.59 0.48
Nr. Obs. 9646 12910

















25Table 8: Determinants of the number of subordinates as middle
manager
Dep. var.: Adjusted (indirect) span as middle manager
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 Figure 2 Type of Promotions
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Number of Promotions and Outside Hires by Type: January 1997 - July 2001
Workers - Job Level 0
Managers Prof. Man.
Prof. 
























Number of Promotions and Outside Hires by Type: September 2001 - May 2004





























































































































































































































Wage difference between team leaders and workers
Wage difference between professional managers and workers
Wage difference between managers and workers
Wage difference between professional middle managers and workers
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